Massachusetts’s Highest Court Confirms: Individuals Can Be Sued Personally for Sexual Harassment

LEGAL UPDATE  ·  MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAW

Massachusetts’s Highest Court Confirms: Individuals Can Be Sued Personally for Sexual Harassment

September 2, 2026  |  Alex Booker, Esq.

Massachusetts nonprofits that run fellowships, mentorships, or research-training programs now face a wider liability picture. On May 19, 2026, the Supreme Judicial Court held in Sabatini v. Knouse that the state’s sexual harassment statute, G. L. c. 214, § 1C, allows a victim to sue the individual perpetrator directly — not just the institution — for harassment occurring in an academic or fellowship setting. That is the holding. Here is what led to it, and what it changes for the organizations we work with.

The Case

Kristin Knouse, a fellow at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, alleged that David Sabatini — her former MIT instructor, thesis committee advisor, and Whitehead mentor — sexually harassed her over several years, including during and after a sexual relationship she felt unable to end without risking her career. An internal Whitehead investigation later found that Sabatini had engaged in and tolerated sexualized conduct in his lab and had fostered a culture of fear around reporting it. Sabatini resigned; he then sued Knouse and Whitehead for defamation and related claims. Knouse counterclaimed under the sexual harassment statute.

A Superior Court judge dismissed her counterclaim, reasoning that the statute reaches only educational institutions, not individuals. The Appeals Court agreed. The SJC reversed, holding that nothing in the statute’s text shields individual perpetrators, and that the statute’s remedial purpose calls for a broad construction.

Why the Statute Works This Way

Section 1C incorporates the definitions of sexual harassment from G. L. c. 151B (employment) and c. 151C (academic settings). It does not incorporate c. 151C’s separate “unfair educational practices” provision, which limits liability to the institution itself. The Court read that omission as deliberate: where the Legislature meant to limit a claim under § 1C to specific provisions of c. 151B or c. 151C, it said so expressly elsewhere in the same section. Because nonvocational students and fellows typically have no administrative remedy under c. 151C, they can sue directly in Superior Court under § 1C without first filing with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

What This Changes, Operationally

This decision does not change what counts as harassment. It changes who can be named as a defendant, and it should sharpen an organization’s focus on prevention, reporting, and prompt response. A supervisor, mentor, principal investigator, or program director accused of harassing a fellow, trainee, or non-employee participant can now be sued in their individual capacity in Massachusetts, separate from any claim against the organization. For organizations, the practical takeaway is not to insulate alleged harassers; it is to make sure policies, reporting channels, investigations, and insurance arrangements are clear before a complaint arises:

• Insurance coverage. Employment practices liability and D&O policies do not automatically extend to a person sued in their personal capacity. Confirm your policy’s definition of “insured person” actually reaches a c. 214, § 1C claim, not only claims against the entity under c. 151B.

• Defense-cost and indemnification rules. Bylaws and agreements should make clear, in advance, how defense costs will be handled when an individual is named personally, including any exclusions or limits for misconduct. Clarity here protects the integrity of the response process and avoids ad hoc decisions once facts are still being investigated.

• Reporting channels for non-employees. Many harassment policies are written around the employer-employee relationship and do not clearly address fellows, trainees, or other non-employee participants — precisely the population c. 151C’s administrative gap leaves without an agency remedy, and now free to go straight to court.

• Investigation readiness. An internal process that can move quickly, credibly, and without conflicts matters more, not less, once a matter can bypass the MCAD entirely. The goal is a fair, trauma-informed response that protects complainants, preserves evidence, and allows the organization to take corrective action based on the facts.

Where to Start

If your organization runs a fellowship, training, or mentorship program, three things are worth checking now: what your EPLI and D&O coverage actually reaches, whether your indemnification language addresses personal-capacity suits, and whether your harassment-reporting policy is written to cover non-employee participants. We’re glad to walk through any of the three.

Source: Sabatini v. Knouse, SJC-13781 (Mass. May 19, 2026).

This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Reading this article does not create an attorney-client relationship. For advice specific to your organization's situation, contact Commonlight Legal LLP.

Alex Booker is the Managing Partner of Commonlight Legal LLP, a boutique law firm serving nonprofits in Massachusetts, DC, New York, and Connecticut. He advises executive directors and boards on employment law, governance, and general nonprofit counsel.

Before founding Commonlight, Alex adjudicated federal employment cases at the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, where he researched and advised on novel issues in federal personnel law, and he litigated whistleblower, wage and hour, and civil rights cases on behalf of employees at a DC employment firm. He is admitted to practice in Massachusetts and Washington, DC.